Ahead of the midterms, Americans and Europeans lose faith in Trump

The Midterms 2026 fall within a period in which transatlantic relations are changing rapidly. The German Marshall Fund (GMF) describes three simultaneous shifts. Europe should take on more responsibility for its own security and for supporting Ukraine. At the same time the domestic social contract on both sides of the Atlantic is shifting, and technological-economic competition with China shapes the agenda ²³. The Foundation for Science and Politics (SWP) assessed in March 2026 that Europe must fundamentally reassess its relationship with Washington, between cooperation, circumvention and open resistance ³¹.

The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) identifies growing transatlantic pressure points in September 2026 ³². The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) warned in September 2026 of forthcoming clashes between the United States and its European partners ³⁷. The Carnegie analysis from 13 October 2026 interprets Trump's approach toward Ukraine as an opportunity for Europe to assume a more independent role ⁶⁰. However, this contradicts a reading that continues to point to ongoing European dependence on the United States.

The Federal Agency for Civic Education points out in its analysis of Germans' image of Russia that public opinion in Germany toward Russia has remained stably sceptical over the years despite propaganda efforts ³.

For US domestic politics, the Pew Research Center assessed as early as July 2026 that the economy is at the centre of Midterm election decisions ¹². It confirmed this on 8 October 2026 for all voter groups ⁴². Surveys by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs illuminated the foreign policy dimension of the election in October 2026 ¹¹. Another report from the same institute from February 2026 documents American rejection of a Donbas handover as part of a potential peace deal ³⁶.

Gallup reported in September 2025 of growing desire for a swift end to the war ⁵² and documented broad pessimism regarding a peace agreement in April 2026 ⁶¹. Chatham House places the 2026 Midterms in the same category as the 2006 midterm elections and calls them a possible rare foreign policy election ¹³.

In energy and economic policy, the ifo Institute assessed the energy policy framework conditions for German policy debates in June 2026 ⁵⁴. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) formulated the perspective of German industry on transatlantic relations ahead of the US elections in September 2026 ⁵⁹. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy established on 8 October 2026 with the Ukraine Support Tracker that of the announced 100 billion euros in German aid to Ukraine, only 41.7 billion euros actually flowed to Ukraine ⁵⁵.

• Polling institutes and research portals: Quinnipiac University (September 2026, eleven point lead for Democrats) ³⁰, Pew Research Center (declining trust in Trump's Ukraine policy, April 2026, October 2026 on mobilisation and the role of the economy) ²⁷+312 Pew Research Center41 pewresearch.org42 pewresearch.org, YouGov (Trump popularity, double-digit lead for Democrats, data centres) ²⁴+329 yougov.com39 yougov.com40 yougov.com, uspollingdata.com (trends in approval for Ukraine aid) ²⁸, AP-NORC (October 2026, top line issues) ⁴³, Gallup (ending the war and peace agreements) ⁵²+161 news.gallup.com, Infratest dimap (ARD Germany Trend September and October 2026) ³³+134 infratest-dimap.de, Körber Foundation (Berlin Pulse 2025 and 2026) ³⁵, Allensbach (survey cited by news.de, 65 per cent see the USA as a risk) ⁵³, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology KIIS (trust in the USA and NATO) ⁴⁴+145 radiosvoboda.org.
• US think tanks: Brookings Institution (loss of Ukrainian trust in US mediation, redistricting, election procedures) ⁸+215 X: @BrookingsInst16 X: @BrookingsInst, German Marshall Fund (transatlantic recalibration, midterm implications) ²⁰+321 X: @gmfus22 X: @gmfus23 X: @gmfus, Chicago Council on Global Affairs (foreign policy and midterms, Donbas survey) ¹¹+136 globalaffairs.org, Chatham House (historical comparison 2006 and 2026) ¹³, CSIS (Trump era, imminent clashes) ³⁷, Atlantic Council (energy and Ukraine peace talks) ³⁸, Council on Foreign Relations (explanation of the diesel deal) ⁵⁰, Carnegie Endowment (Trump's approach as an opportunity for Europe) ⁶⁰.
• German and European institutions: SWP (redefining Europe's relations with the USA) ³¹, DGAP (Russia-Ukraine-USA negotiations, transatlantic pressure points) ⁷+132 dgap.org, Federal Agency for Civic Education on Germans' image of Russia ³, Munich Security Conference with Wolfgang Ischinger's comments on strained alliance relations ¹⁷, ZDF Politics Barometer, ifo Institute (rapid energy policy bulletin June 2026) ⁵⁴, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (Ukraine Support Tracker) ⁵⁵, BDI (transatlantic relations before the US elections) ⁵⁹.
• Civil society and churches: The umbrella organisation DGB with a statement from its eight member unions on Anti-War Day 2026 ⁴⁸, German and Polish Catholic bishops with a joint statement on continued support for Ukraine ⁴⁹, Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) with position paper "Peace for Ukraine" ⁵⁶, Peace movement coalition nie-wieder-krieg.org (nationwide demonstration on 3 October 2026) ⁵⁸.
• Political actors: US President Donald Trump (blocking new Russia sanctions) ¹⁹, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (criticism of Trump's decision) ¹⁸, US Senators Elizabeth Warren, Jeanne Shaheen and Chris Coons (investigation into the sanctions pause) ⁴⁷, Members of Congress such as Jim Himes (@jahimes) comment on the acceleration of aid packages after the midterms ¹⁴.
• Media and specialist publications: eurotopics.net (European press review) ¹, heise.de (Starlink throttling, EU alliance against Starlink) ⁹+151 heise online (englisch), Wirtschaftswoche (Federal Government response to the diesel deal) ¹⁰, AFP and Al Jazeera English (international reporting on the sanctions blockade) ¹⁸+119 X: @AJEnglish, spacewatch.global (Washington throttles Starlink and Starshield) ⁴⁶, Euronews (IRIS² as a European response to Starlink) ⁵⁷, Forbes Ukraine and Radio Svoboda (KIIS survey on Ukrainians' trust) ⁴⁴+145 radiosvoboda.org, news.de (citation of the Allensbach survey) ⁵³.

The polling situation in the USA is unfavourable for the Trump administration. The Quinnipiac poll from September 2026 shows an eleven point lead for the Democrats in the generic congressional match-up ³⁰. YouGov published two new models on 25 October 2026 for likely voters, in which the Democrats lead the Republicans by double digits in both ⁴⁰. An AP-NORC poll from 15 October 2026 describes a majority that considers Trump's domestic and foreign policy to be failing and blames him for high prices ⁴³.

A Fox News poll from 16 October 2026 places his approval at 36 per cent, a YouGov survey from 10 to 12 October 2026 documents a marked decline in his popularity ahead of the midterms ³⁹. Pew Research showed as early as April 2026 that Americans had become less confident about Trump's Ukraine decisions ²⁷, and reported on 8 October 2026 that given poor public sentiment, Democratic voters are more mobilised for the midterms ⁴¹ and the economy is the most important issue for all voters, though party supporters set different priorities on other issues ⁴². uspollingdata.com documents a decline in support for continued US Ukraine aid from 70 per cent in 2022 to 55 per cent in 2026 ²⁸.

A Gallup poll, which according to the source was published in September 2025, shows that a majority of Americans wish for a quick end to the Russia Ukraine war, yet a counter-check dates the poll to August 2025 and finds a majority (52 per cent) still supporting Ukraine aid, which is contradictory ⁵². A further Gallup survey from 10 April 2026 describes widespread pessimism among Americans regarding a possible peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia ⁶¹.

On foreign policy, Trump refrained from implementing new Russia sanctions just days before they were to come into force ¹⁹. US Senators Elizabeth Warren, Jeanne Shaheen and Chris Coons announced on 15 October 2026 an investigation into a five-month sanctions pause by the Trump administration against Russia's war machine ⁴⁷. The Senate press release confirms the current announcement, but counter-checks date the beginning of the pause to 2025, which is therefore contradictory.

Zelenskyy criticised the blockade sharply on 17 October 2026 and warned that Moscow was trying to cut heat and electricity to millions of Ukrainians before winter ¹⁸. Trump had previously stated, on 10 October, that it was time for a new Ukrainian president ¹⁹. Brookings describes in a 2026 analysis the declining trust of Ukraine in US mediation ⁸, the DGAP speaks of "theatre for Trump" regarding the negotiation line ⁷.

The Council on Foreign Relations explains in detail on 13 October 2026 the diesel deal with Russia negotiated by Trump ⁵⁰, the Atlantic Council emphasises on 10 October 2026 that the energy question is complicating ongoing Ukraine peace talks ³⁸. The Carnegie analysis from 13 October 2026 argues that Trump's approach steamrolls Ukraine but offers Europe a chance for a more independent role, yet an Al Jazeera interpretation contradicts this and points to Europe's continued dependence on the USA ⁶⁰. spacewatch.global reports on 15 October 2026 that Washington is throttling Starlink and Starshield in Ukraine and calls for European solutions are growing louder ⁴⁶. heise online reports on 15 October 2026 that European telecommunications companies are forging an alliance against Musk's Starlink ⁵¹. Euronews describes on 16 October 2026 IRIS² as Europe's answer to Starlink and elaborates on Germany's role ⁵⁷.

In Germany, the ZDF-Politbarometer from 10 October 2026 documents concerns about NATO because of Trump's policy, the ARD-DeutschlandTREND from 2 October 2026 and from 4 September 2026 charts the course of sentiment regarding the transatlantic relationship ³³+134 infratest-dimap.de. The Körber Foundation published the Berlin Pulse 2025/26 on transatlantic relations and documents a growing distance between Germans and the USA ³⁵, although according to counter-checks the publication is dated 25 November 2025 rather than 2026.

A poll reported by news.de on 15 July 2026 shows that 65 per cent of Germans see the USA as a risk for world peace, yet the counter-check places the figure in an Allensbach survey from January 2026, not a July poll, which is contradictory ⁵³. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy reports on 8 October 2026 that of Germany's announced 100 billion euros in Ukraine support, only 41.7 billion euros actually reached Ukraine ⁵⁵.

The ifo Quick Service on energy policy from June 2026 places the energy policy debate in economic science context ⁵⁴, the BDI takes a position on transatlantic relations in September 2026 ahead of the US elections ⁵⁹. The media frame in Germany is shaped by the debate over the throttling of Starlink and Starshield and the diesel deal, and according to wiwo.de, the federal government said Russia remains excluded as an oil supplier ⁹+410 wiwo.de46 spacewatch.global51 heise online (englisch)57 Euronews.

Civil society called for continued solidarity as eight DGB unions did in their anti-war day declaration on 1 September 2026 ⁴⁸, German and Polish Catholic bishops called for further support for Ukraine on 5 May 2026 ⁴⁹, the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) formulates its position "Peace for Ukraine" ⁵⁶. According to the peace alliance nie-wieder-krieg.org, a nationwide demonstration against war took place in Berlin and Stuttgart on 3 October 2026 ⁵⁸.

In Ukraine, according to a KIIS poll from 7 January 2026, trust in the USA and NATO has declined significantly. Forbes Ukraine and Radio Svoboda report consistently that a majority of Ukrainians still expect serious help from Europe and are increasingly mistrustful of the USA ⁴⁴+145 radiosvoboda.org.

At the scientific level, think tanks bring together the debates. The GMF emphasises that Washington's growing polarisation and possible election outcomes have significant strategic, economic and security implications for Europe, with reference to issues such as tariffs, Iran policy and AI market risks ²¹+222 X: @gmfus23 X: @gmfus. SWP, DGAP, CSIS and Carnegie urge a fundamental redefinition of relations with Washington, between cooperation, circumvention and confrontation ³¹+332 dgap.org37 csis.org60 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Brookings and Chatham House highlight organisational and historical factors: delays in postal voting, redistricting and court disputes shape the path to the midterms ¹⁵+116 X: @BrookingsInst, a foreign policy dominated election result like 2006 is conceivable ¹³.

Several social media posts from expert and media actors have been classified as claim sources and are reproduced here with attribution. Chatham House states on X that the 2026 Midterms could be a rare foreign policy election, comparable to 2006 ¹³. In the same discussion, Chatham House quotes Democratic congressman Jim Himes as saying that following a change of power, aid packages would be moved not in nine months but in nine days or nine weeks ¹⁴.

The Brookings Institution announces on X analyses of redistricting, postal voting delays and legal disputes as defining factors ¹⁵+116 X: @BrookingsInst. The Munich Security Conference quotes Wolfgang Ischinger as saying that recent conflicts have strained relations among allies ¹⁷. AFP and Al Jazeera English report on X on Zelensky's criticism that Trump's blockade of Russia sanctions "rewards" Putin ¹⁸+119 X: @AJEnglish.

The German Marshall Fund publishes several analyses on X. Europe must manage a balancing act to secure support for Ukraine, as Ukrainian security is increasingly understood as European security (quote Olga Prokopenko) ²⁰. Bruce Stokes from the GMF cites findings at a Brussels roundtable that a majority of Americans reject a war with Iran, tariffs are the top issue, only one in four Americans support complete elimination of EU tariffs, and the AI-driven market bubble is a risk to the global economy ²¹.

In a GMF alumni town hall format, President Alexander Hoop Scheffer stresses that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security ²²+123 X: @gmfus. Shashank Joshi (@shashj) presents YouGov model calculations showing that among residents within two kilometres of data centres, the share intending to vote Democrat has risen since May from 54 to 61 per cent, whilst nationally it has risen only from 53 to 55 per cent ²⁴+125 X: @shashj.

The DGB states on the 2026 Anti-War Day, speaking for all eight member unions, that solidarity with the attacked Ukraine must be continued and at the same time work must be done on negotiated solutions ⁴⁸. German and Polish Catholic bishops call in a joint statement from 5 May 2026 for continued support of Ukraine ⁴⁹. The Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) formulates its independent position on "Peace for Ukraine" ⁵⁶. The peace alliance nie-wieder-krieg.org called for nationwide demonstrations on 3 October 2026 in Berlin and Stuttgart ⁵⁸. The BDI locates the interests of German industry ahead of the US elections as an attributed association position ⁵⁹.

Aggregator reports from Russian and Ukrainian language portals (112.ua, Vietnam.vn in Russian, prospect.com.ru, УРА-Информ, Белновости) present the Midterms primarily from the perspective of possible consequences for Russia and Ukraine. They are thematic references without independent content evidence and are mentioned here only as context ²+44 Vietnam.vn5 prospect.com.ru6 УРА-Информ26 Белновости.

The data suggests a midterm election with strong intertwining of domestic and foreign policy issues. The converging poll figures on Trump's approval, price perception and a Democratic lead ³⁰+339 yougov.com40 yougov.com43 apnorc.org mean an open window for Europe and Ukraine. Several think tanks and cited Congressional representatives suggest that a democratically controlled chamber could move aid packages more quickly ¹⁴+220 X: @gmfus22 X: @gmfus. The Senate investigation into the sanctions pause announced on 15 October 2026 ⁴⁷ increases political pressure further, even though the exact duration of the pause is presented contradictorily.

Long-term trends and erosion of trust

Meanwhile, Pew, Gallup and uspollingdata data signal a longer-term decline in approval for Ukraine aid and growing pessimism about a peace agreement among the US population ²⁷+328 uspollingdata.com52 news.gallup.com61 news.gallup.com, which remains structurally effective even in the event of a change of power, while the Chicago Council documents clear rejection of a Donbas handover ³⁶.

Loss of trust and continuity in Germany

A dual movement is emerging in Germany, comprising loss of confidence in the USA according to the Körber survey, ARD-DeutschlandTREND, and Allensbach, and concerns about NATO according to ZDF-Politbarometer ³³+334 infratest-dimap.de35 koerber-stiftung.de53 news.de, flanked by a technology debate about dependencies (Starlink, Starshield, IRIS², EU Telecom Alliance) and energy (diesel deal, ifo Rapid Service) ⁹+710 wiwo.de38 atlanticcouncil.org46 spacewatch.global50 cfr.org51 heise online (englisch)54 ifo-Institut57 Euronews. The gap documented by the Kiel Institute between the announced 100 billion euros and the actually disbursed 41.7 billion euros of German Ukraine aid ⁵⁵ puts political support for further assistance under additional pressure to demonstrate results.

Academic statements, particularly from GMF, DGAP, SWP, CSIS, Carnegie and Brookings, place this within a broader remeasuring of transatlantic relations, with emphasis on European self-responsibility ⁷+88 brookings.edu20 X: @gmfus22 X: @gmfus23 X: @gmfus31 swp-berlin.org32 dgap.org37 csis.org60 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The bpb analysis of Germans' image of Russia suggests that the basic attitude towards Russia remains stable despite propaganda influence ³, which secures the political latitude of German governments on the Ukraine question. DGB unions, German and Polish Catholic bishops and the EKD underscore civil society backing for further support for Ukraine ⁴⁸+249 katholisch.de56 Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD), while the nationwide peace demonstration on 3 October 2026 shows a mobilisable counter-voice that prioritises a swift end to the war ⁵⁸. The BDI points to the economic policy dimension of transatlantic uncertainty ⁵⁹.

According to KIIS, confidence in the USA is waning in Ukraine, while Europe is perceived as a more reliable partner ⁴⁴+145 radiosvoboda.org. This pattern corresponds with the Brookings observation of declining confidence in the US mediation role ⁸ and with the debate about European alternatives to Starlink and Starshield, flanked by the EU Telecom Alliance and the IRIS² project ⁴⁶+251 heise online (englisch)57 Euronews. The Carnegie interpretation that Trump's approach offers Europe an opportunity remains disputed. An Al Jazeera counter-test points to European dependence on the USA ⁶⁰.

The YouGov observation of residents living near data centres ²⁴ remains a single survey with an interesting pattern. Its transfer to the national result should be interpreted with caution. No independent confirmation beyond the cited source is available.